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DAVID SHAPIRO'S ADVERSARY 
STATEMENT ON FEDERALISM 
Patrick E. Higginbotham* 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE. By David L. Shapiro. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 154. $19.95. 
This book reflects the extraordinary combined force of scholar-
ship and advocacy by a master of both. Professor David Shapiro 
practiced as a young lawyer with a distinguished Washington, D.C. 
law firm and served as Deputy Solicitor General for nearly three 
years. He is a Professor at Harvard Law School and one of the 
leading scholars in the field of federal courts and federal jurisdic-
tion. For many years, lie has authored the leading casebook in the 
field. 
Asked to deliver the Julius Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern 
University School of Law in 1994, Professor Shapiro saw that the 
three-lecture series offered the opportunity to structure a treatment 
of federalism in an adversary format, without losing the balanced 
and honest presentation of the scholar. In the first lecture, he states 
the case for the "nationalist," in the second, for the "federalist," 
and in the third lecture he offers a synthesis. Each lecture has the 
approximate length of a merit brief in the Supreme Court. To-
gether, the three lectures - now published as Federalism: A 
Dialogue - comprise a dialogue in the tradition of Henry Hart, 
Lon Fuller, and the classic Socratic process, but they are much 
more. 
I do not see a book review as a launching pad for the reviewer's 
ideas, with little more than a mention of the book being reviewed. 
Rather, I hope to describe the three lectures by providing samples 
from each with no pretense of capturing nuance or of complete de-
scription. My views of their strengths and weaknesses conclude the 
review. 
The direct draw upon the judiciary's adversary model allows 
Shapiro's hand to move free from the clutter of balancing-as-you-
go. This model, as applied in the first two lectures, allows him to 
present each case in its most powerful form, to state the polarities 
before turning to the gray areas of current debate. The result is 
clarity and balance. 
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1961, 
University of Alabama. - Ed. 
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There is a vast amount of writing about federalism; most of it 
circles like satellites in solitary orbits. Yet, this book brings rich 
insight and freshness to the subject by sorting the many arguments 
and exposing them to the light of context and relevance. This is no 
task for the timid. An adversary brief demands that arguments be 
ordered and marshaled, a challenge with so much in the libraries 
claiming relevance. 
I. THE NATIONALIST BRIEF 
The first lecture begins with a frontal assault: There is no signif-
icant constitutional restraint on national power or on the displace-
ment of state law and regulation by national law. Shapiro proceeds 
by denying that the Constitution was a compact and instead asserts 
that its authority came directly from the people; the fact that consti-
tutional power was not drawn from sovereign states "is confirmed 
by the background and circumstances of the Constitutional Con-
vention, the nature of the ratification process, and most signifi-
cantly by the text and structure of the Constitution itself" (p. 15). 
To bolster this argument, Shapiro points out that no state could 
block ratification and that ratification required support of states 
representing a majority of the population of the new Union. Quot-
ing Jefferson Powell, he points to the strongest evidence of the na-
tionalist thesis: " '[T]he Constitution contained no explicit 
guarantee of state sovereignty'" (p. 17). Nor, he says, could any 
such constitutional guarantee be implied, given that the then-
prevailing legal thought refused to recognize divided sovereignty. 
Turning to the Preamble, Shapiro asserts that the language "We the 
People" was not simply an airy opening flourish. Certainly Patrick 
Henry, the master of the flourish, did not see it that way: He com-
plained that the Preamble should begin, "We the States." 
Then, with the deftness of the advocate, Shapiro draws support 
from the familiar argument that the Bill of Rights, won by the anti-
Federalists in their carving of federal power, evidences a sovereign 
role for states. He does not deny that such an inference is permissi-
ble or that it has force when viewed alone. Rather, he points to the 
diluting, if not alternative, inference that the Bill of Rights in limit-
ing federal power delivered on the Preamble's promise to protect 
individuals from federal excesses. The brief, after many more argu-
ments than I have mentioned, asserts that any constitutional force 
to state sovereignty has been eroded by subsequent amendments, 
evolving constitutional doctrine, and historical practice (p. 26). It 
concedes, but then discounts the force of The Federalist Papers by 
reminding us that they were the work of advocates. 
Part Two of the brief for national authority declares that "The 
Existence of Significant State Autonomy is Economically Counter-
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productive" (p. 34). This section of the brief takes the conclusions 
of Part One as given - especially that there are few constitutional 
limits upon the exercise of national power at the expense of state 
power. It examines the optimal allocation of power between state 
and federal government. In this context, Shapiro asserts that tradi-
tional economic argument rests on "asserted virtues of rivalry or 
competition" (p. 35). The states supposedly serve as countervailing 
forces to the federal government and engage in competition among 
themselves. Again, Shapiro takes the debate to first principles: He 
contends that the resistance to national authority "hinge[ s] in large 
part on a value judgment that is sometimes, but not always, made 
explicit - a judgment that a free and competitive market is pre-
sumptively ... preferable to governmental regulation" (p. 37). He 
continues by arguing that even the market's supporters recognize 
that its imperfections will require repair best done at the national 
level; in any event, the model of competing states is overstated eas-
ily. Political rights of travel do not assure practical economic free-
doms; it is not so easy to move capital investment from a declining 
market to a rising market; and the ever-haunting externalities and 
transaction costs will persist. As for "public goods," Shapiro sees 
"no self-evident reason why the size of those units, and the basis for 
raising the needed revenues to run them (including, perhaps, some 
form of user fees in some instances) cannot or should not be deter-
mined on a national level" (p. 40). 
Shapiro's brief for nationalist government concludes by assert-
ing that we need a "Strong National Authority ... in Order to Pro-
tect the Rights and Interests of Individuals and Groups" (p. 50). 
This contention rests heavily on the history of federal expansion of 
constitutional limits upon states by federal courts and Congress. 
II. THE FEDERALIST BRIEF 
The brief for federalism begins by asserting that the constitu-
tional convention took place against a "background of independent 
state power ... and was called for the explicit purpose of amending 
the Articles [of Confederation]" (p. 59). Shapiro recalls that the 
delegates were not elected by the people but appointed by state 
governments, each of which had an equal vote. Turning again to 
The Federalist Papers, the argument becomes that, although they 
were written to persuade, they cannot be ignored as strong contem-
poraneous expressions of purpose - to reassure the states and 
thereby to secure ratification of the Constitution. Shapiro contin-
ues by arguing that the states were the building blocks of union. 
For example, he points out that the electorate of the House of Rep-
resentatives was the electorate of the most numerous branch of the 
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state legislature, and that Article I not only limits the powers of the 
national government but also protects the states from each other. 
After marching through constitutional text, the brief turns to the 
Guaranty Clause of Article IV. Shapiro's handling of the Guaranty 
Clause in the point-counterpoint of the two briefs illustrates the 
strength of the dialogue. In the first brief, Shapiro argued that Arti-
cle IV "seems essentially designed to protect the states from each 
other (and to provide for the common defense)" (p. 21). He read it 
as a federally enforceable limitation on the state, an admonition to 
the people of the states to maintain a republican form of govern-
ment. Through the eyes of the federalist, however, Article IV 
seems to protect states from federal interference; the clause be-
comes a guarantee of state autonomy. 
The brief for the federalist position moves to the "Virtues of 
State Autonomy from Economic and Related Policy Perspectives" 
(p. 76), and then to "Liberty and Social Virtues of State Autonomy" 
(p. 91). It also parades the familiar virtues of local rule, including 
the option for regional compacts when "local" problems do not 
conform to state boundaries. The brief advances the state as the 
presumptive level of government and insists that the case for fed-
eral power must overcome that presumption. Indeed, it contends 
that when a need arises for units larger than a single state, we logi-
cally should begin with an examination of interstate compacts 
before turning to the federal level. Relatedly, the very existence of 
several polities fosters individual freedom. An individual may 
move to a state that is more hospitable than his home state. Finally, 
the brief argues that the state itself can decide best whether a local 
problem is handled best by counties or cities. 
III. SHAPIRO'S SYNTHESIS 
Having advocated the federalist and nationalist positions, 
Professor Shapiro, in his third and concluding lecture, sorts through 
the arguments, locates common ground, and gives us his own views 
unshaped by advocacy. In his words, he undertakes to "strike the 
balance." 
Shapiro first points to constitutional text in emphasizing three 
points "worthy of repetition" (p. 110). First, the broad Article I 
power, despite its coupling with the expansionary power of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clauses, has deliberate jurisdictional limits; sec-
ond, the Constitution secures national protection to states from 
other states and protection from requests of "insurrection from 
within" (p. 111); third, as Deborah Merritt writes,1 the guarantee of 
1. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guaranty Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
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a republican form of government is "a promise of protection both 
against upheaval from within and intrusion from without," a guar-
antee that the states will be protected "as politically functioning en-
tities" (p. 111). Shapiro points to New York v. United Statesz as 
confirmation of the decisional force of the Guaranty Clause - that 
is, that the core of the guarantee of a republican form of govern-
ment is political accountability of the representatives. It follows 
that the national government may not coerce the representative to 
take legislative action. 
Shapiro acknowledges that the Civil War and the New Deal 
brought large shifts in the state-federal balance. He points out that 
despite these nationalizing forces, the Civil War amendments, the 
courts' expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, and changes in 
technology, much of the regulation of our daily lives - of our 
"property, education, local transportation, family relations, [and of] 
the definition of liability-creating civil and criminal conduct" (p. 
114), for example-has remained with the states. Shapiro explains 
why. In his eyes, "significant structural reasons [explain] the reten-
tion of state authority in so many ·areas of general importance" (p. 
116). These structures include the bicameral national legislature -
where each state is assured at least one representative - the Sen-
ate - where each state is assured two senators - and the Electoral 
College - where presidential politics are channeled to state-by-
state campaigns. These, in turn, are supported by the Supreme 
Court's insistence that Congress speak clearly when it would pre-
empt state law. But he finds much more than structural arrange-
ments in these constitutional texts. 
Shapiro points to a " 'sub-constitutional' area of considerable 
breadth where strong forces work toward the continued recognition 
of state authority but do not compel it" (p. 118). Several forces 
operate in this subconstitutional area to uphold the states as func-
tioning political entities. The allocation of the burden of persuasion 
provides such reenforcement. Shapiro would allocate the burden to 
those who would contend for national power and give to the states 
the presumptive right. Furthermore, Shapiro places importance on 
the fact that states inevitably tailor and shape the national programs 
that they implement. Finally, he suggests that the opportunities for 
regional cooperation - "intermediate federalism" - also are iden-
tified best by states. Shapiro sees potential for such ventures and 
uses New York v. United States as an example (p. 127). 
2. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Act requiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to Congress's tenns 
violate the Tenth Amendment). Shapiro states: "[T]he decision may be the most coherent 
and effective effort to address the constitutional underpinnings of federalism to have 
emerged from the Supreme Court's continuing struggle with the issue over two centuries." P. 
111. 
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His larger point is that some national roles actually support fed-
eralism. He identifies five: first, when a necessary public good will 
not be furnished absent national power; second, when economies of 
scale are achievable only nationally - for example, safe air traffic; 
third, when national power enters the dialogue of private rights; 
fourth, when legislation affects redistribution of wealth; and fifth, 
when the c.ourts play a role in monitoring congressional purpose. 
The mark of this subconstitutional zone is flexibility. Its flexibil-
ity is essential given that the zone is cut athwart with powerful cen-
tripetal forces that must oscillate with powerful centrifugal forces. 
IV. THE DIALOGUE CONTINUED 
I only have skimmed these tightly organized lectures to give the 
reader some idea of their subject and treatment. By definition, my 
review presents an incomplete and distorted view of this book, 
though a distortion correctable by reading. At almost any tum, the 
regular players in this debate who do read this book can, and some 
will, point to a contention and scoff, saying that it fails to develop 
the full range of relevant scholarship. For example, they may dwell 
upon the fact that Shapiro sometimes devotes few words to enor-
mously complex subjects such as the treatment of the economics of 
state rivalry, races to the bottom, and convoys. Such criticism will 
miss a large point about this book. In the process of writing a brief, 
a dialogue leading to judgment, advocates leave parts on the cutting 
room floor, and for good reason. They fall under the forces of con-
text and relevance, the discipline of dialogue. That is not to de-
mean their contribution. To the contrary, the intricate explication 
of theories of public choice and the economics of state rivalry are 
prerequisites to such a writing. That material left on the cutting 
room floor says much about the roles of the cut and uncut. The one 
does not displace the other; they remain in complementary tandem 
serving different purposes. This is a dialogue, not an exploration of 
fresh material and data, as Professor Shapiro makes plain at the 
outset. 
The debate about federalism is at least as old as the republic, 
true enough, but this work arrives at a particularly propitious time. 
There is a large discontent with remote governmental decisionmak-
ing, if the debates of political campaigns are accurate signals, and I 
think they are. We are seeing political leaders describing their work 
as revolutionary when it aims to return federal decisions to local 
government. In short, there is a heated debate now in progress 
about the "best" location of decisionmaking for specific social 
problems. Professor Shapiro's dialogue is about the meaning of 
"best." 
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Perhaps Professor Shapiro's message adapts to the view of the 
reader, but I found his work to be proof of a large theorem: Pro-
cess matters - in both instrumental and intrinsic terms. -In the im-
mediate sense, the process chosen by Professor Shapiro is the jewel 
in this work. In a larger sense, the very fact that our state govern-
ments have work to do that of necessity cannot be done at the fed-
eral level - and that the federal government does work that the 
states are better suited to do - dictates the terms of debate over 
the location of decisional responsibility for government programs. 
I see federalism as a constitutionally ordered structure and sub-
stantive concept. It is also a process. As Professor Shapiro puts it, 
"the true genius of American federalism lies in the continuing, and 
constitutionally assured, basis for dialogue - for moral, political, 
economic, and social debate over the merits of the allocation of 
power among the various branches" (p. 140). The book offers a 
superb defense of federalism, a lasting contribution. There is more. 
His writing proves the power of Socratic process, so long ago appro-
priated by our profession. Moreover, federalism ultimately wears 
its strongest armor as a constitutionally required process. Professor 
Shapiro's book leaves the reader painfully aware of how often that 
assertion is undervalued and its wisdom missed. 
Extolling the virtue of federalism as a process does not mean 
that it is without need of normative support. At least two recent 
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the structural protections sur-
rounding the process require judicial support. In New York v. 
United States, the Court located a limit upon federal power in the 
line between the persuasion and coercion of state representatives.3 
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court was foreshadowed by her 
writing in FERC v. Mississippi. 4 I suspect Justice Black would have 
joined her in New York v. United States, as his own opinion in Testa 
v. Kaus required state courts to enforce federal law. The lesson of 
Testa was that federal law is, by definition, the creature of state citi-
zens and thus cannot offend state policy.6 It is true that federal law 
is not foreign law and that the lines between the people and the 
Constitution are at times direct and do not pass through the state-
house. Nonetheless, refusing to tolerate a co-opting of people's 
elected representatives lies comfortably with this core principle of 
Testa. 
The extraordinary decision of United States v. Lopez7 came 
down while Professor Shapiro's book was in galley. He therefore 
3. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166-69. 
4. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
5. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
6. See 330 U.S. at 392-93. 
7. 115 s. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
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discusses Lopez in the Epilogue and is cautious about its full impli-
cations. Lopez places at the least a large cloud on the vision of 
unlimited congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Ear-
nest predictions of where Lopez will take Commerce Clause juris-
prudence seem little more than educated hope, and the possibilities 
seem widely divergent. Lopez may amount to little more than sym-
bolic jurisprudence - a fleeting genuflect to limits upon congres-
sional power that in practice are always tantalizingly just out of 
reach. On the other hand, it may evidence a willingness of the 
Court to locate limits. Having drawn a line, it must either draw 
another or erase. 
With all respect to the four dissenting justices, the Lopez Court 
had no real choice, and that is the large blinking caution light hung 
out by that case. In its brief and oral argument, the Government 
threw down the gauntlet by refusing to concede and by failing to 
identify any limits upon the commerce power that would remain if 
the Court sustained the statute. A total lack of judicially enforcea-
ble limits under the Commerce Clause cannot comport with a vision 
of the Constitution as an organic instrument. Our reverential invo-
cations of dispersed power demand more than procedural limits. 
Lopez could not uphold the prohibition against carrying a gun in 
proximity to a school without exposing a jurisprudence already 
struggling with its candor. Of course, there is always the contention 
that the structural channeling of the political process protects the 
states when federal courts head for the sidelines, refusing to refe-
ree. This view appeals to my modest ambitions for the federal judi-
ciary. That said, the recent inability of Congress to resist the 
political temptation to federalize crime frontally challenges our 
faith in the ability of states to fight for themselves in the political 
arena, as it seems we have no normative limits enforceable by fed-
eral courts. This view of states' rights as the scraps left after the 
congressional meal deals the Third Branch out of the federalist 
structure. So, in the end, there is comfort in the concept of federal-
ism as a dialogic process as well as in the encouraging signs in New 
York v. United States and Lopez that the judicial retreat to the side-
lines may not be for the whole game. 
